A

WORD

TO THE

PEOPLE of ENGLAND,

ON THE

SUBJECT OF A LATE CAPTURE OF

NEUTRAL SHIPS,

and of

THE PROJECT OF CONFEDERACY,

SUPPOSED TO EXIST IN THE

NORTH

AGAINST

THIS COUNTRY.

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WORD

TO THE

People of England, &c.

IT muſt have occurred to the obſervation of every man, and not without pain to every well thinking perſon, that ſeveral of our daily papers, namely, moſt of thoſe in the intereſts of oppoſition, have exerted themſelves, with more than ordinary malignity, to repreſent the ſubject before us in the worſt colours; and that they have in this inſtance, as in every other in which they could flatter the enemies of their country, and miſrepreſent the acts of government, been faithful to that ſyſtematic rule of conduct, which their repeated defeats, and the diſappointment of their ſiniſter hopes, by the vigour of adminiſtration, have ſuggeſted to their malevolence. But it ſhall be the object of theſe

lines to undeceive the honeſt and ſober portion of the people, who, unaware of the falſhoods daily propagated in thoſe papers, have ſuffered themſelves to be miſled, by the contemptible comments which have lately ſwelled their columns, in relation to the preſent ſubject, while I endeavour to ſhew that it is to the rancour and jealouſy entertained by ſome of the Northern courts, that of Denmark in particular, of the commercial proſperity of Great Britain, and not, as the hirelings of oppoſition would feign have us believe, to the arrogant, unjuſtifiable pretenſions, or haughty deportment of our own people towards the reſt of the world, that we are to look for the ſource of the prevailing miſunderſtandings. To thoſe baſe and narrow-minded propenſities alone, are to be aſcribed all the clamour, all the complaints that our ſecret enemies in the North have conjured up, and which are now, ſo faithfully, re-echoed by the advocates of falſhood and of our enemies in this country; nor do I deſpair, after ſhewing the true nature of thoſe differences, of gaining over many to the ſame opinion of them with myſelf, by a mere impartial expoſition of facts, unaided by any official information, and ſtill leſs by the perſuaſive powers attendant on elegance of diction or literary inveſtigation of ſuch ſubjects, though ſupported by common ſenſe and reaſon, and ſome ſhare of experience acquired in the courſe of a long reſidence abroad.

THE ſyſtem now, apparently, manifeſting itſelf in the North is not new: one ſimilar in its tendency diſcloſed itſelf towards the latter end of laſt war, and our differences with Holland, which country advanced the ſame unjuſtifiable pretenſions, to a free and uninterrupted intercourſe with the enemies of Great Britain, which it would appear Denmark now conceives the deſign of eſtabliſhing, were brought to a criſis, by the diſcovery of proceedings decidedly hoſtile on the part of that Republic, as may eventually prove to be the caſe with regard to Denmark, if the government of that country avows or juſtifies the late hoſtile aggreſſion, of which we have ſo much reaſon to complain. Indeed, during the whole of the preſent war, the conduct purſued by the ſubjects of that nation, has been more than equivocal; the moſt marked partiality for our enemies has diſtinguiſhed them in multitudes of inſtances, and it will not be improper for every Engliſhman to attend to the conſequences, which he may expect hereafter, if this ſemi-warfare, under the cloak of neutrality, is to be tolerated, in compliance with the murmurings of diſaffection at home, the malicious inſinuations of our external enemy, or the thirſt of pelf of pretended friends.

IT may firſt be aſked what is the nature of the preſent war? Each nation engaged in it will inform you, that it is a conteſt undertaken in defence

of its juſt rights, deareſt intereſts, and independence; and individuals muſt form their own judgment of its expediency and juſtice, from ſuch facts and documents as have come to their knowledge reſpecting its origin and cauſes. An inquiry into the merits of a queſtion ſo often and ſo ably diſcuſſed in parliament, and latterly, ſo judiciouſly treated in the incomparable work of Mr. Herbert Marſh, who has immortalized his name, among fair and candid men, by this production, would be foreign to the preſent purpoſe: it is ſufficient for us to know that war actually exiſts, that that war is waged, on our part, ſingly againſt the united maritime ſtrength of the firſt naval powers of Europe, and one of thoſe powers, in particular, the relentleſs rival of this country, and the moſt deſperate and inveterate foe which, perhaps, a nation had ever to contend with; one which no ſacrifice, ſhort of the moſt abject conceſſion, will ſatisfy if ſhe proves ſucceſsful in the preſent conflict.

Does it not follow then of courſe, does not ſelf-preſervation inform us that our whole object, all our moſt ſtrenuous endeavours ſhould be to weaken and deprive that cruel enemy of the power of moleſting us, and to employ with effect thoſe means of defence which it has pleaſed God, in the largeneſs of his bounty to this nation, to place in our hands?

THE ultimate object of a juſt and neceſſary war, ſuch as ours is, is ſecurity at home, reſpect abroad; in a word, a ſafe and honourable peace;—to attain it we muſt exert our valour, ſkill, and vigilance in that line of warfare where they are moſt conſpicuous, and to which it ſeems nature has peculiarly adapted us, in conformity to the happy allotment made to us by providence of an inſular ſituation. To our exertions by ſea, to our naval ſtrength alone, therefore, are we to look for protection and the preſervation of our liberties and political exiſtence as an independent nation. To our fleets, under the bleſſing of providence, are we indebted for the advantages we enjoy, and it ſurely is no leſs a duty carefully to watch that our enemies receive no undue aid and aſſiſtance from nations denominating themſelves friendly, than it is to defend ourſelves from thoſe enemies, or otherwiſe, while with our right arm we are repelling the open united aſſaults of France, Spain, and Holland, and ſpending blood and treaſure in our cauſe, we ſhall have to protect ourſelves, with our left, from the ſtiletto attacks and ſecret blows from beneath the neutral cloak of Denmark and Sweden. Indeed there would be a glaring abſurdity, and an unpardonable ſupineneſs on the part of thoſe, who are intruſted with the management of our deareſt concerns, if they were tamely to ſuffer ſuch proceedings; and if the illicit practices of neutrals have

been ſometimes connived at, as being the iſolated acts of certain individuals, unauthorized and unſupported by their ſuperiors, it does not follow that thoſe practices are uniformly to be tolerated, or to paſs unnoticed, eſpecially when they aſſume the aſpect of a hoſtile diſregard of common uſage, and the law of nations, and appear to be countenanced by thoſe very authorities whoſe duty it is to check and ſuppreſs them.

It may be neceſſary, for the information of ſome readers, to ſtate what the practices alluded to may be, and I am happy to be able to do ſo, not only from perſonal obſervation, but upon high and reſpectable judicial authority. I ſhall take Denmark as the ſtandard of the moſt unwarrantable proceedings ever aſcribed to a nation in amity with his Majeſty, and endeavour to ſhew that the ſubjects of that crown have, more than any other people known, indulged in unlawful peculation and the eager thirſt of gold, at the expence of other ſtates, to the great annoyance, eſpecially, of Great Britain, and the unſpeakable advantage of her numerous enemies.

By the eſtabliſhed laws of every nation, having colonial poſſeſſions, all trade, by foreigners, with thoſe poſſeſſions, was poſitively prohibited in times of peace. On this principle, not only foreign ſhips

and cargos, but even Britiſh ſhips, and the property of Britiſh ſubjects, who had poſſeſſions in the colonies of the enemies of Great Britain, and who had not time to remove their property, were condemned in all former wars; and the principle is clear; for if foreigners were prohibited, by the laws of the different nations poſſeſſing colonies, from trading with them, what could the ſhips and cargos, iſſuing from thoſe ports at the opening of a war between them and Great Britain, be, but the property, at leaſt as far as reſpected the cargos, of her enemies, and conſequently liable to ſeizure.

In time of war it has been the cuſtom of thoſe nations to connive at the the admiſſion of neutral foreigners to their colonial ports, eſpecially ſuch of them as conceived themſelves totally inadequate to the protection of that branch of commerce from the vigilance and ſuperiority of the Britiſh navy; and from this circumſtance, ſo peculiarly gratifying to the neutrals, they are enabled to promote their carrying trade, better their navigation, multiply their ſhips, and in a ſhort time to amaſs immenſe wealth: though, in fact, this is an unlawful and dangerous traffic, inaſmuch as it is undertaken to cover and conceal the enemy's property from the Britiſh cruiſers, and ſubjects, accordingly, all ſuch neutral veſſels as are engaged in it to the ſtricteſt ſearch, detention, and ſubſequent adjudication, the-

ſources of endleſs complaints and remonſtrances between the reſpective governments.

But the temptations held out to neutral nations, in the courſe of the preſent war, have been more than ordinarily great, and they have been yielded to with proportionate avidity and imprudence. The naval ſuperiority of England was never more conſpicuouſly, or more glorioufly manifeſted than in the courſe of this war. The flag of France is, excepting amongſt her free-booters, almoſt unknown upon the ſeas. That of Spain droops in concealment within her ports; and the once proud pendant of Holland has been totally eclipſed by that of Great Britain, while her merchants, ſtill ardent in the purſuit of gain, have exchanged their colours for thoſe of Denmark, Sweden, and Pruſſia.

These neutrals, Denmark in particular, eagerly ſeizing the golden opportunity, have realized their happieſt dreams of lucre, at the expence of their good faith, honor, and national character. The Danes, more aſpiring, even, than the Dutch of old, aimed at the rank formerly held by them among the maritime nations of Europe, and hoped to become the carriers not only of Holland, but of France and Spain;—they fondly indulged in the moſt extravagant, and moſt extenſive ſpeculations;—their profits on ſalvage, to uſe this term, of the

enemy's property were exorbitant;—they ſaw private fortunes rapidly creating; elegant dwelling houſes daily riſing within their capital; the revenues of the ſtate increaſing beyond ordinary proportion; and the general air of mercantile ſplendour and proſperity, which their ſea ports every where ſuddenly aſſumed, promiſed the happieſt reſults. In a word, they ſaw, with ignorant exultation, the day draw near when they were to vie with Great Britain, the grand obſtacle in their way to undue gains, and the eternal object of their envy, while they vainly flattered themſelves, that the continental ſucceſſes of her rival, would pave the way to the final eſtabliſhment of their own commercial greatneſs on the ruin of hers, never conſidering the vaſt differences between the countries, the inſurmountable difficulties which ſtood in the way of any thing, but ephemeral proſperity; that their inhabitants neither poſſeſſed the ſame induſtry, the ſame capital in trade, the ſame local advantages, or the ſame conſtitutional vigour in ſtate, which have all ſo eſſentially combined in raiſing Great Britain to the pitch of pre-eminence ſhe now enjoys.

It may be neceſſary here to ſhew in what manner the Danes have ſucceeded in covering the property of the enemy to the extent they have done, as aſſertions, unſubſtantiated by facts, may be met by

aſſertions equally plauſable, or equally unſatisfactory to the reader.

It will not be denied that the enemies of England, in general, and eſpecially the Dutch, whoſe ſhips and property have been blocked up in the harbours of Surinam, and elſewhere in the Weſt Indies and America, by the Britiſh cruiſers, have called out to other maritime nations to come and aſſiſt them to carry home their colonial produce: nor will it be denied, that, as almoſt all the inland trade of Holland is carried on by commiſſion, ſo their external navigation is carried on by ſeamen who are the natives of the northern parts of Europe, whilſt their own people are employed in the canals and trackſchyuts. The maſters of moſt Dutch ſhips are Danes, and nothing, certainly, could be more obvious than the policy of covering Dutch property by fraudulent intervention, and falſe tranſfers to Daniſh ſubjects; and, from the extent and continuance of theſe practices, it would, indeed, almoſt appear, that the payment of duties into the Daniſh treaſury, was as irreſiſtable for the Daniſh government, as it was found impoſſible for the Daniſh merchant to withſtand the monopolizing of the trade and navigation of Holland. Thus things have gone to great lengths: pretended ſales, *pro forma*, have been made by Dutch proprietors to Danes, and other neutral ſubjects, in the ports of

Surinam and the Dutch colonies abroad, and at Amſterdam and other ports of Europe.

At theſe ſales, the proper parties were not always preſent themſelves, the equivalent conſideration was not paid down, and the tranſaction was neither before proper magiſtrates on oath, nor had the true forms of notarial juriſdiction. Crews were actually ſent from Copenhagen, Altona, and elſewhere to Surinam, &c. The Dutch governor himſelf, is abſolutely ſaid to have hoiſted the Daniſh flag, and *entremetteurs*, or middlemen, agents, and brokers charged, in their correſpondence and papers, ſo much for commiſſion for what they called *neutralization*. Royal ſea paſſes were obtained at Copenhagen as for ſhips belonging to Denmark, and for perſons as Daniſh inhabitants, which ſhips had never been in the ports of Denmark, and which perſons had paſſed the greateſt part of their lives in foreign countries, under foreign protection. The very bills of admeaſurement were made only with the curious clauſe of *ad interim*, viz. to be valid only until ſuch time as they ſhould come to Denmark. It muſt be further obſerved, that the purchaſes made in the colonies of the enemy, particularly by the Danes, were attended by a mode of proceeding as equivocal, as it tended ſtrongly to conceal his property. Perſons, in the character of Danes, were ſent from Europe to buy up Weſt

Indian produce; for theſe cargoes, bills were drawn for the payment, upon condition of the ſhip and cargo's ſafe arrival, and that the perſon, on whom the bills were drawn, ſhould have the commiſſion; —thus, in caſe the ſhip was captured, and never arrived, there was no actual payment fairly out and out, and no loſs to the Dane. There was another practice; that of drawing and re-drawing, as when the Dane has been drawn upon, and paid the pretended price for the goods, he draws again upon the Dutch merchant, in whom all property begins and ends. How, then, were ſuch difficulties to be got over in our courts, how was it poſſible to diſcover the ultimate, for if the parties had no conſcience in falſifying oaths, proofs, and papers, little could be done towards diſcovering the truth, and checking an intercourſe ſo oppoſite to every thing that is to be hoped for by this country in a naval war? Beſides, even on the ſuppoſition of neutrals having a right to buy and ſell in the enemies' colonies, and of its being only required of them to prove that there was a *bona fide* purchaſe, in open market, out and out, for a fair equivalent actually paid, ſtill ſo much fraud, of the kind above related, appeared openly in the court of admiralty, that the deciſions could not be different from what they were; for notwithſtanding the clamours raiſed by the Danes, every neutral ſubject muſt be conſcious that, as ſuch a trade muſt be attended with peculiar ſuſpicions, it

was incumbent on each of them to produce more exact documents; and as their profits were immenſe on the general ſcale, ſo individuals ought the more patiently to have abided the conſequences of ſeizure and inveſtigation. It is ſcarcely neceſſary to add, that theſe doubts and ſuſpicions were increaſed, in proportion to the facility with which it was known that briefs of burgherſhip, conſtituting the holder a Daniſh citizen, and giving him all the privileges and advantages of a Daniſh ſubject in matters of trade, were ſold in every town in Denmark to the firſt comer, whether a Cherokee Indian or a Mandingoe Negro, and that Engliſhmen, as well as Dutchmen, were frequently, under a ſimilar metamorphoſe, enabled to hold a direct intercourſe with all the enemies ports abroad, to diſplay the Daniſh flag, and exhibit Daniſh papers, though, in the caſe of the former, this intercourſe was not only unlawful, but even criminal, upon the ground of expreſs law to that effect, in time of war, and upon the principle of no Engliſhman, or other Britiſh ſubject, having a right, at any time, to claim the protection of a foreign power in any tranſaction, whether commercial or other, that is injurious to the intereſts of his lawful ſovereign. Conſular certificates, declarations, and interventions, by which the neutral ſubject ſought to protect his veſſel, from the ſearch of ſuch conſular agent's own countrymen at ſea, and to legalize his

cargo, by the ſeeming acknowledgment of its lawful character by the enemies of Great Britain, was another inſtrument of deception in the hands of the neutraliſt, and a new ſyſtem introduced by the politics of France, contrary to the ancient eſtabliſhed laws of nations, which no judge in admiralty cauſes could ever ſubmit to. But in adducing the multiplied inſtances of the practices purſued, in regard to the Weſt Indian ſettlements of our enemies; it is not to be underſtood that the ſpeculations of the Danes were confined to that quarter of the world only:—the Eaſt as well as the Weſt; the Mediterranean as well as the ocean—all equally afforded the faireſt opportunities for ſimilar abuſes, and the great ſettlement of Batavia, in particular, has been preſerved to Holland by the fraudulent intervention of Daniſh ſubjects alone, while the whole trade of the Mauritius paſſed through their hands, under the ſame fictitious form, with that of the Dutch and French Weſt Indian iſlands; although the whole capital of Denmark would ſcarcely have ſufficed to bring one of thoſe branches of commerce fairly, out and out, into their own hands. In Europe, the ports of Carthagena, Cadiz, Ferrol, the ports of Toulon, l'Orient, Breſt, and Rochefort received their naval ſtores from the hands of neutrals, and the Daniſh flag is every where conſpicuous, where the enemies of England ſtand in need of ſupplies of this or any other deſcription, whe-

ther lawful or unlawful;—but it will happen with this flag, at the close of the present war, in increased proportion, as it did with the same flag at the end of the last, when, to quote a single example only, out of eighty vessels, which sailed the seas, in the name of one great mercantile house of Copenhagen, under Danish colours, there was not one but what assumed its native Dutch character at the pacification, and acknowledged its real proprietor by returning to the ports of Holland. The metamorphose of the French, Dutch, and Spaniards into Danes, will be still more striking at the close of the present war: at the signing of a peace, the scanty flag of Denmark will resume its proper place, and convey a juster idea of its original insignificance than may be now entertained of it, by such as are ignorant of these things. But enough has been said to prove the necessity of the strictest watchfulness on our part; and where is the man who, conscientiously, can justify such proceedings; where is the Englishman, who has the interests of his country at heart, that would submit his fair and impartial judgment of these matters, and his right of self-preservation to false notions of justice to those who would so cruelly impose on his good faith, and who have, so barefacedly, trespassed on his borders, and trampled his best fences underfoot, while they professed their friendship for him, and declared themselves neuter in the quarrel between him and

his enemies;—but above all, where is the Engliſh-man who, though, with native humanity and characteriſtic benevolence, he might be diſpoſed to ſpare the individual who injured him, would tamely ſubmit to the ſame incroachments, if he diſcovered a really hoſtile deſign in a nation at large, and the intention, openly manifeſted, of ſupporting by acts of violence and force the lawful exerciſe of his juſt prerogative? The late circumſtance of a Daniſh ſhip of war reſiſting, by arms, the uſual viſit to which neutral merchantmen are liable, on the part of every belligerent power, is one which no exiſting treaty, no law of nations, no uſage, ancient or modern, can juſtify or countenance: it was a direct infraction of the neutrality of Denmark, by one of her own commanders, a moſt unwarrantable oppoſition to the lawful exerciſe of the duty impoſed on the Britiſh officers, and a wanton violation of a right inherent in every belligerent power, and naturally ariſing from a ſtate of war; a right which our great active rival, even, did not diſpute, in a caſe which occurred, in the Eaſt Indies, in the courſe of Lord Cornwallis's memorable war with the late Tippoo Sultaun; a right, in ſhort, in many inſtances ſanctioned and acknowledged by treaty, with proviſion only againſt arbitrary and vexatious detention, where papers and other documents appeared unobjectional. But in regard to warlike ſtores, more ſpecific arrangements, ſtill, have been

recipocally agreed on between ſtates, and in many caſes, which a reference to our public treaties would diſcover to the reader's ſatisfaction, each individual article, conſtituting ſuch ſtores, is named and declared contreband by mutual conſent, and proper forms of ſea paſſes for their reſpective ſubjects formally ſtipulated:—with what conſcience then can it be pretended, that the eſcort of a ſhip of war, of a nation not a party in the conteſt, ſhould ſcreen the neutral merchantman from the inſpection of his papers, or the ſtricter ſearch of a belligerent power, whoſe only hope of a ſucceſsful iſſue, reſts on the aſſurance of the enemy's receiving no undue ſuccour or advantage from nations profeſſing neutrality and friendſhip. If protection of this kind is lawful in one inſtance, it muſt be equally ſo in a thouſand, and the right of viſiting muſt ceaſe;—the admiſſion of ſo prepoſterous a pretenſion would ſhortly put an end to every thing, and we had much better accede at once to the principle which French policy would feign preſcribe, but which Britiſh ſagacity contemptuouſly rejects, of ſuffering neutral bottoms to conſtitute neutral property, and thus deliver up commerce and navy, at a ſtroke, to the mercy of our foes.

The attempt at reſiſtance made by the Daniſh officer, on the occaſion alluded to, was an act of

open hoſtility, which it requires no legal authority, no quotation of precedents to prove, though great authorities and precedents may be cited, as was done, to the edification of every hearer preſent, at the delivery of the able and luminous ſentence, ſometime ſince paſſed on another neutral convoy, by a wiſe and learned judge, in a high and reſpectable court. It is gratifying to know that ſuch men's opinions coincide in favour of the poſition here laid down, but it need only the aſſiſtance of common ſenſe and reaſon to prove the ſame, and a reference to the ordinary occurrences of life to demonſtrate, that, he who ſeeks to obſtruct another in the ſalutary effort of ſelf-defence, from the attacks of a third, is no more that man's friend but his enemy, whatever he may pleaſe to call himſelf.

What would our countrymen, ſo noted for their love of juſtice and fair play, ſay, if on the occaſion of their favorite athletic diverſion of pugiliſm, wreſtling, or any other trial of bodily ſkill and vigour between two men, a third perſon, profeſſedly the friend of both parties, was to interpoſe occaſionally with concealed weapons and refreſhments for the ſupport of one combatant, who had promiſed him an ample reward, in preference to the other, but that that man ſhould be carefully watched, and even ſearched by the ill-uſed antagoniſt, every time he appeared on the ground; and would not

their juſtice be ſtirred up to indignation, if this ſame perſon ſhould return another time, with the ſame intentions, to the field, but armed and determined to reſiſt the ſearch to which he had rendered himſelf liable by his partial conduct? If he actually reſiſted, what then became of his profeſſions of neutrality? Did he not by an overt act declare himſelf openly hoſtile to the offended party, and expoſe himſelf to the ſevereſt treatment and reſentment if he ſhould perſiſt in vindicating a conduct ſo diametrically oppoſite to all his former profeſſions of friendſhip?

Here is an exact expoſition of the caſe in queſtion, equally intelligible to the peaſant as to the ſtateſman, one founded on the law of nature and reaſon, the acknowledged baſis of that law of civilized nations, by which ſtates, calling themſelves poliſhed, are governed in their various relations to each other, not only in peace, but in war.

If the Daniſh government ſhould attempt to juſtify the conduct of the naval officer, who fired from his ſhip upon our people, their firſt ground of argument will probably be, that the eſcort was given to the merchantmen which we propoſed to viſit, not as a protection againſt us, but againſt pirates, eſpecially the free-booters of the coaſt of Barbary, with ſome of which they are actually at war.

So far all would be well, and there would be nothing to ſay in reply;—they will in the next inſtance add, that the eſcort of a ſhip of war is a ſufficient guarantee for the fair and regular conduct of the merchantmen under her command, and that it would be degrading to her flag to ſuffer the viſitation of her convoy by the ſhip of another power; that thoſe merchantmen were received and admitted to the benefit of her protection upon condition only of their carrying no warlike ſtores, or contraband goods to the ports of any of the belligerent powers, and that an oath to that effect had been exacted of the ſeveral maſters of thoſe veſſels, previous to their ſailing. Here ariſes a different queſtion, but one which it will not be difficult to ſolve.

Are we, on the faith of an oath, taken by a parcel of Daniſh or Swediſh commanders of merchantmen, ſworn we know not how, or in what legal form, or by what deſcription of men; an oath delivered to a foreign commander, who has neither intereſt or concern in verifying the truth of it; are we, on ſuch grounds, to relinquiſh our juſt and natural right of aſcertaining a point, which every belligerent power is bound, by the laws of ſelf-preſervation, to aſcertain; namely, whether the cargos of thoſe merchantmen be *bona fide* neutral, or the property of the king's enemies: and are we to forego our natural claims out of compliment to an

armed ſhip, a profeſſed ſtranger to the cauſe at iſſue between us and our enemies? Great, indeed, would be our complaiſance, not to uſe a harſher term, if we did; but it is the peculiar good fortune of this nation, at this day of increaſed trial and difficulty, to poſſeſs men at the helm of affairs of approved firmneſs and capacity, and who will never conſent to ſo abject a ſacrifice of our honour, and of all that is moſt dear to us as Engliſhmen. No danger, therefore, of that kind is to be apprehended, and it will, no doubt, appear on calm and mature enquiry into this ſubject by the Daniſh government, that if neutrality is any thing more than an empty word, they ſhould not perſiſt, on the vain pretext of miſtaken dignity, in reſiſting our lawful rights by force of arms, but yield, with good grace, to a principle equally compatible with their own honour, as conſiſtent with the law of nations and cuſtom of war.

An able and experienced negociator is now on his way from this country to the northern court, from whence this new ſpecies of aggreſſion proceeds, and we muſt truſt to his abilities and ſteady deportment for an amicable adjuſtment of our differences;—but if that court, blinded to its real intereſts, by any vain promiſes of the enemy, or elated by any deluſive hopes, which the unſteadineſs of ſome of our continental connections may have

ſuggeſted to an illiberal policy, ſhould avow the hoſtile procedure in queſtion; we ſhall then, probably, have to engage in a new war, which no Engliſhman need lament, inaſmuch as the honor and future welfare of his country reſts on the point in diſpute, although he may regret the further effuſion of blood, and look with ſorrow on the abyſs of ruin into which his new antagoniſt is wantonly about to plunge.

THERE are men, who, unacquainted with Denmark's means of attack and defence, may form ſuch erroneous conjectures on that ſubject, as the malice of the diſaffected would ſuggeſt to them; and there are others, who, better acquainted with the relative powers of that country, may ſtand appalled at the bug-bear of a northern confederacy, and their frightened fancy exhibit to their view the fleets of Denmark, Sweden, and Ruſſia combining their operations at ſea with thoſe of a Pruſſian army by land, and changing the face of the globe. But let us take a more impartial view of things, and we ſhall ſoon perceive that ſuch fears are imaginary only, and that people ſhrink more from the ſound than they would do from the reality of this war, if, indeed, ſuch a war ſhould be in contemplation with thoſe ſtates, which is extremely problematical. It muſt, in truth, be acknowledged, that there is ſomething very extraordinary in the conduct of the

court more immediately in queſtion, and the circumſtance of two ſhips, belonging to that ſtate, acting in a manner ſo exactly correſponding, though in different ſeas, would ſeem to corroborate the idea of the exiſtence of a ſecret underſtanding between her and other maritime powers of the north, as it is hardly to be ſuppoſed that, without ſome ſuch concert, ſhe would have adopted ſo deſperate a meaſure as to hazard ſingly a conteſt with this country; but ſtill this is doubtful, and it may be only an experiment made on the temper of the Britiſh cabinet, which the reſolute firmneſs of this cabinet will induce that court to abandon with as much haſte, perhaps, as it undertook it. But in order to be prepared for every contingency, let us ſuppoſe the exiſtence of this confederacy, and let us review the forces of our new antagoniſts in hoſtile array, while we examine the conſequences to them and to ourſelves, of ſo unjuſt a league, ſo incoherent, ſo prepoſterous, ſo unnatural a ſtate of things.

We ſee Denmark with thirty-three ſail of the line in the harbour of Copenhagen, her only naval arſenal, with two or three others on the ſtocks, and from twelve to fifteen frigates and other ſmaller veſſels. Two, at moſt, of theſe ſhips carry upwards of ſeventy-four guns—ſome that number, but the greater part only ſixty-four. Of the number of ſhips of the line, eight at leaſt are wholly unfit for

ſervice, and if five-and-twenty could be equipped, it is the utmoſt; but it could never happen that they could all be properly manned at the ſame time, and if it were poſſible, it is extremely improbable that the whole fleet would be riſked, at once, to the hazards of an action, even, with an enemy of inferior force. Ten or twelve ſhips, therefore, is the utmoſt number that would ever quit the Baltic, the reſt would be reſerved to replace, occaſionally, ſuch of them as wanted refitting, after ſervice or accidents at ſea, and as guard ſhips for the protection of their coaſts, and the harbours of Norway in particular, where there exiſts a ſpirit not altogether friendly to the government of Denmark, and a brave people, the enthuſiaſtic admirers of the naval valour and proweſs of Britain, as well as of her invaluable conſtitution.—The Daniſh ſquadron once at ſea, would naturally ſeek the ports of Holland, it might alſo hope to evade the vigilance of our Fleets, and eſcape into their ports; but another Duncan would ſoon appear to paralize its future operations. The manning of this ſquadron, however, muſt firſt be effected before it undertakes any ſort of operations, and, unleſs the Daniſh government has been ſilently purſuing meaſures, in order to ſecure ſo requiſite a preliminary to war, this object would extremely perplex that government in the outſet. The Daniſh as well as Norwegian ſailors, fiſhermen, and other

ſea-faring people, along the coaſts of thoſe Kingdoms, are all enrolled and obliged, by law, to ſerve on board his Daniſh majeſty's fleets, whenever a proper notice is delivered to them to repair to their allotted ſtations; and, indeed, by this mode, a reſpectable ſquadron, fifteen ſail of the line, perhaps, might be ſoon manned, provided the event had been foreſeen, and thoſe men could be found unemployed at their reſpective homes:—but this can hardly be ſuppoſed to be the caſe at preſent:—thoſe men's livelihoods being procured by their induſtry and varions maritime vocations, it rarely happens that a third of their number is to be met with, on the ſpur of the occaſion; beſides that, it is well known that, as in that country of late years, every wiſe and prudent conſideration has yielded to the deſire of accumulating wealth—the boon held out to the Daniſh mariners of becoming the carriers of the world, afforded too promiſing a proſpect of general profit, to admit of thoſe permits being withheld from them by the government, which, by law, it is authorized to grant to ſuch as are deſirous of ſerving abroad, or of abſenting themſelves on diſtant voyages. Thus, on an emergency, at this ſeaſon of the year, it would prove extremely difficult to man five ſhips of the line, and an equal number of frigates, and if the ſummer months are loſt, the campaign becomes hopeleſs for a nation,

with which the elements and the ice, in particular, are at variance for the remaining portion of the year.

FROM this view of the naval power of Denmark, it will not be contended that much is to be apprehended by this country from that quarter, nor will it be thought upon an enquiry into that of Sweden, that the acceſſion of that country ſhould much alarm us. The diminiſhed fleet of Sweden, reduced, ſince the laſt war with Ruſſia, to twenty ſail of the line, would unwillingly riſk its reputation beyond the Sound, and though a diviſion of four or five ſhips might join the Danes in the north ſea, the remainder would be ſatisfied with a ſummer cruiſe in the Baltic or Cattegate, and be wanted to protect Gottenburgh, as well as Copenhagen, and other trading towns. The manning of the Swediſh fleet would be attended with ſtill greater difficulties, than, even, that of Denmark, and the expences of a war, in the preſent ſhattered ſtate of the finances in that country, would be more ſeverely felt, and more reluctantly ſubmitted to than in the former, where public credit is on a better footing, and the treaſury more judiciouſly adminiſtered; yet even there the moſt ſerious conſequences might be apprehended from any great additional taxes or burthens on a people naturally ſelfiſh, and not enjoying the ineſtimable privilege of aſſeſſing themſelves.

With reſpect to Ruſſia, her navy is more reſpectable than the two former put together; ſixty ſail of the line, with a proportionable number of ſmaller ſhips, are ſaid to compoſe her marine:—but in the preſent ſtate of uncertainty, which prevails in regard to the real deſigns of that court, it would be miſplaced to name his Imperial Majeſty, the Emperor Paul, otherwiſe than with profound deference, and juſt admiration of the noble deeds atchieved by his arms, during the time he favoured the common cauſe; and little more ſhall, accordingly, be ſaid here, on the part that monarch may be ſuppoſed to take, in the ſo much rumoured concert of the north, than merely, that a naval war might poſſibly not be attended with the ſame brilliant ſucceſſes which ſignalized his imperial majeſty's arms by land, as his ſhips are neither calculated for very ſevere ſervice in diſtant ſeas, nor his mariners very numerous, or likely to be much diſpoſed to enter with ardour into a war with that late ally, of whoſe irreſiſtable valour and dexterity, on his native element, they have had ſo many opportunities of receiving the moſt evincing proofs; ſuch proofs, as might make even the brave and hardy Ruſſian pauſe, ere he entered the liſts of his opponents.

Of Pruſſia, as merely a military power, little need be ſaid, although that country, notwithſtanding, poſſeſſes the means of materially injuring our trade,

by the power and influence ſhe enjoys over Hamburgh, and other ports in Germany, from which ſhe might entirely exclude us, if ſhe could find any compenſation, in that meaſure, for the more eſſential injury the commerce of Germany, in general, and of her own fine province in Sileſia, ſo noted for its linen manufactories, in particular, would experience from being cut off from all exportation by ſea.

THIS haſty ſketch of the power and maritime ſtrength of the projected alliance againſt this country; if, indeed, it be true that the dictates of malevolence, and the baſeſt paſſions ſhould have overcome the ſuggeſtions of ſound policy, which muſt ever militate againſt the formation of ſuch an alliance will ſuffice to convince us, that the whole northern marine, united with that of the reſt of Europe, is inſufficient to cope, ſucceſsfully, with the triumphant fleets of Great Britain; and it may now be well to ſtate what the conſequences of ſuch a combination might be, as well to our new enemies as ourſelves.

THE trade of the Baltic, and even to Germany, would be, at once, cut off from this country, and the momentary inconvenience would be ſeverely felt, though it could not be productive of any very ſerious miſchief, as ſuch a ſtate of things could not be durable. We ſhould receive no naval ſupplies from the Baltic, and all ſtores, of that kind,

would riſe to an enormous price in every part of his majeſty's dominions. Government having a title to pre-emption, would of courſe provide againſt the wants of the navy, but commercial navigation would experience conſiderable diſtreſs. On the other hand, the enormous ſums of money which are annually remitted to the ſtates of the Baltic, for thoſe articles, would remain at home, or be uſefully employed in ſetting hands to work in every other corner of the globe, from whence the ſame commodities could poſſibly be procured. We ſhould, indeed, have to ſend further for them, but we ſhould in the end obtain them, and the Baltic ſtates, perceiving the fatal conſequences to themſelves, of ſuch a diverſion of their firſt branches of trade, would not be tempted to purſue the ſame blind and rugged path of policy to its concluſion—their own eventual ruin.

If thoſe ſupplies were cut off from us, we ſhould take care that they were equally ſo from the reſt of Europe, and the general ſtagnation which would follow, would become inſupportable to the northern powers, as the article of naval ſtores is the only valuable return they have to make for their own ſupply of many of the neceſſaries, and all the luxuries of life from other countries. It is, beſides, particularly with this country that their's is a gaining trade—with moſt other nations it is a loſing

one. They take little from us, in compariſon with what we receive from them; and the large returns we are obliged to make them in ſpecie are the life and ſoul of all their other commerce. Beſides, what is it that Britiſh induſtry might not accompliſh? Should we tamely ſit down under our privations, and thus acknowledge our dependence on thoſe nations for the eſſential requiſites towards maintaining that marine, which is the pride and glory, as well as the ſupport of Great Britain;—the envy and admiration, as well as the dread of every hoſtile power? Certainly not. Why ſhould not the noble fir-woods of Scotland, though inland and of difficult acceſs, be rendered ſerviceable, by Britiſh perſeverence, and yield maſts to ſhips of Engliſh oak as well as turpentine; and how would Norway brook the loſs of thoſe chief ſources of her commerce? What would be ſaid in Sweden if Britiſh iron was found ſufficient, and if, with patriotic ſpirit, all ornamental work in this article were to ceaſe in England, in order to ſupply our dock-yards and naval arſenals with the requiſite quantity? What would be ſaid there, if tar, pitch, &c. were to be imported in greater quantities from America; and would not the dealers in hemp, flax, and coarſe linens, in the Pruſſian and Ruſſian provinces look confounded, on perceiving that the exigency of the caſe had driven the bold and enterpriſing genius of Britiſh traders to the ſearch of

the ſame commodities, not only from the well-known ſources of induſtry, in this ſpecies of merchandize, in Scotland and Ireland, but from Barbary, America, the Levant, and elſewhere? Can the occaſional ſupplies of wheat, and other grain, we receive from Denmark, tempt us to forego the precious right ſhe has raſhly ventured to diſpute us; and would not legiſlative proviſion, for the extenſion and improvement of agriculture at home, ſoon render us independent of her for this neceſſary of life? As for the trifling articles which her jealouſy of our ſuperior workmanſhip, and excellent materials, in manufacture, allows her to take of us, and of which more is ſmuggled than lawfully imported by her own people, they are too trifling to deſerve mentioning among our loſſes in trade by war.

With regard to Hamburgh, indeed, and the uſe of the rivers Elbe and Weſer, the kings of Pruſſia and Denmark might, as was before hinted, materially injure us, by depriving us of theſe only remaining channels of commercial intercourſe with Germany and the northern continent of Europe; but all communication with the ocean would likewiſe be ſhut to them, and it is not to be believed that the elector of Saxony, or other pacific ſtates would ſilently acquieſce in ſo violent a meaſure, and the conſequent ſuſpenſion of all exportation of their ſuperfluities by ſea.

The firſt immediate conſequence of our naval operations would be, the total ſuſpenſion of the payment of the Sound duties, into the Daniſh treaſury; and it need only be ſaid that 160,000l. ſterling are annually received under that head, to ſhew that it is a moſt important item of revenue to the ſtate, and one which Denmark would as reluctantly part with, as it could little ſpare, from the civil liſt, or immediate expediture of the royal houſhold, to which it is principally appropriated—ſcarcely a ſhip would venture through thoſe ſtraits, and the Britiſh cruizers may, in caſe of a war with Denmark, more effectually deprive the Dutch and French of their ſupplies from the Baltic than they do even at this moment. We ſhould deprive the Dutch of the ineſtimable advantage they derive from the uſe of the canal of Kiel, in Holſtein, through which their ſmall craft and coaſting veſſels, paſſing from the Baltic into the river Eyder, and ſo on into the German ocean, now ſupply their wants, as well as thoſe of France, without danger of interruption from our ſhips of war, which, drawing more water, are unable to purſue them through the ſhoals and narrows to which thoſe people immediately betake themſelves; but once at liberty to act, hoſtilely, againſt Denmark, nothing could hinder great Britain from poſſeſſing herſelf of the iſland of Heiligoland at the entrance of the Elbe, and from thence annoying with light veſſels the Dutch coaſt-

ing trade, as it iſſued from the Eyder, at the ſame time that they blocked up the narrow paſſages at the mouths of the Elbe and Weſer, leading to north Holland. Copenhagen, and Altona, from their poſition and military ſtrength; the ſea-ports of Holſtein and of Norway, from their little importance to us, might remain unmoleſted; but Tranquebar, Frederickſnagore, in the Eaſt, Saint Croix and Saint Thomas, in the Weſt Indies, would fall an eaſy prey, and with them all the hopes of Denmark of commercial grandeur and proſperity, to the utter confuſion and trepidation of the whole nation, which attaches the utmoſt conſequence to the poſſeſſion of thoſe ſettlements.

Such being the probable conſequences of war to either party, it now remains to be ſeen, with what juſtice, the ſtates alluded to, could engage in a war with Great Britain, againſt which country there exiſts not, on their part, the ſhadow of one ſingle juſt ground of complaint, either on the ſcore of vexatious treatment, arbitrary proceedings, aggrandizing ambition, or any other of the ordinary pleas for rupture between nations, although, on the part of England, and relatively to Denmark, in particular, great and many grievances may be alledged, if the temper, moderation, and forbearance of her counſels ſhould not impoſe that ſilence,

which any diſpoſition to conciliation manifeſting itſelf in the cabinet of Copenhagen, on the preſent occaſion, may ſuggeſt.

It has been ſaid that, from the very commencement of the preſent war, our cruizers have, arbitrarily ſeized and detained the ſhips of Denmark, lawfully engaged in trade, and it cannot be denied, that many of their veſſels have been ſent in for adjudication, and many cargoes condemned; but upon incontrovertible proof only of their being the property of the king's enemies, and ~~but~~ in all theſe caſes the ſhips being really neutral, have been liberated and freight paid for to the owners, the ſame as if the cargos had been delivered to the French or Dutch merchant.

It has been further alledged that many harmleſs veſſels, really, and *bona fide*, neutral property, have been detained, and the cargos ſeized, though only compoſed of grain and ſuch commodities as every neutral ſubject had a right to deal in, and it muſt be acknowledged, that ſeveral ſhips of this deſcription have, in fact, been frequently ſtopped under various ſuſpicious circumſtances, and when making directly for the enemies ports; but can it be denied, by the moſt rancorous Dane, that the faireſt price has, in all theſe caſes, been paid by the Britiſh government for thoſe cargoes, or that freight, demurrage,

and expences have not been allowed for; all theſe matters being referred, agreeably to act of parliament, to the regiſtrar of the High Court of Admiralty, aſſiſted by two merchants to be approved of by that court, and who, hitherto, have been perſons of acknowledged character and reſpectability, and men who have left off every other ſort of buſineſs.—The complaints of the delays of juſtice have been equally groundleſs. To the reports of the two merchants, juſt now named, which the regiſtrar does no more than authenticate, all parties intereſted may attend, ſtate their exceptions, and if not admitted, come again before the court and be heard upon their exceptions; but any delays, which may occur in theſe proceedings, ariſe ſolely when neutrals themſelves are defective in not producing the proper documents, and are indulged by the court for further time and proof. Does the Daniſh merchant beſides forget, that by the frequent detection which has been made of falſe papers, proofs, ſea-papers, &c. the difficulties of the court are greatly increaſed, and that the utmoſt attention and caution are neceſſary in the inveſtigation of thoſe matters? Does he forget, that when he, perſonally, declares himſelf innocent, and incapable of fraud and deception, others are not equally blameleſs, and that many have been expoſed in open court, where, while they produced their falſified documents, giving a pretended deſtination and conſignment to

their ſhip and cargo, their ſecret inſtructions, ſhewing the true deſtination of both, and tracing out the precautions to be obſerved againſt diſcovery, have been produced, to confound their allegations, and appal their hardy conſciences? Does he forget how often, when proof againſt him has been defective, he has been indemnified to the full amount of his pretended loſſes, and paid a ſecond time by us, for what he had already, perhaps, been paid by the enemy; and does he, above all, forget, that while hundreds of thouſands of pounds have been appropriated to compenſate neutrals for loſſes, that our enemy, whom he patronizes, has, in no one inſtance, reimburſed him for the confiſcation of either ſhip or lading, though many rich and important have been the captures made by his privateers?—And for the gratification of whom, and for what purpoſes has all this clamour been raiſed; for whom are we ſlighted; for whom are we defrauded; for whom are we blackened by theſe ſelf-ſaid friends and neutrals?—For the French nation—which has loaded them and their government with every ſpecies of indignity; which, with bullying inſolence, obliged them to receive the noted pettifogging clerk, who read the ſentence of death to his unfortunate ſovereign, as a public miniſter at the court of Denmark; which, with their wonted diſreſpect for the independence of princes, peremptorily enjoined the ſame court to publiſh

an order for the ſuppreſſion of the croſs and ribbon of St. Louis, and other ancient badges of diſtinction worn by the emigrated French within the Daniſh dominions; which, with true piratical ſpirit, has condemned neutral bottom as well as cargo, in all caſes of capture, although, generally ſpeaking, the latter only is cognizable at law; which has, in contempt of the law of neutrality, formally declared that any one ſingle article of the produce or manufacture of Great Britain, found on board a neutral veſſel, ſhould vitiate the whole lading, and furniſh a ſufficient plea for its condemnation, and which, to its eternal diſgrace, has decreed, by law, that any neutral ſubject, found ſerving on board a Britiſh ſhip of war, ſhould be treated as a pirate, and ſuffer an ignominious death; although, indeed, by the deciſive conduct adopted by Great Britain, on the occaſion of that ſavage decree, it has been never carried into execution. But enough has been ſaid on theſe painful topics, and it only now remains to remove any prejudicial impreſſions which the repeated remonſtrances of the Daniſh government, relative to different violations of the territorial ſovereignty and juriſdiction of Denmark, by our naval commanders, may have made on the public mind, if taken entirely on the credit of that people, and the aſſertions of the partizans of our enemies in this country. The captures made of French and Dutch privateers, within the neutral

limits, have afforded the principal grounds of complaint, on this head, to the court of Denmark againſt the Britiſh cruizers, and it is but juſtice to ſay, not always, though frequently without juſt cauſe.

THE neutral limits, or territorial juriſdiction of his Daniſh majeſty, are ſaid to compriſe an extent of ſea of one Daniſh ſea-league, or four Engliſh miles from the main land, or that of any inhabited iſland, and all veſſels, within that diſtance, are conſidered as within the ſovereignty, and conſequently under the immediate protection of Denmark. Any ſhip, therefore, of whatever nation ſhe may be, that is captured within thoſe limits, is ſaid to be an unlawful prize; and an inquiry into the circumſtances of ſuch capture being inſtituted, the court of Denmark conceives itſelf, in honour, bound to demand the reſtitution of ſuch veſſel from the captor, in order to its being reſtored to the original owner. Among the numerous prizes made this war, of Dutch and French privateers, it has happened that three or four of thoſe veſſels have ſo provoked our naval commanders, by the audacity of their conduct, in hanging on the rear of their convoys, when ſufficiently near the ſhore to admit of their eſcape, as to induce them to overlook the preciſe bounds of their duty, and, in the ardour of purſuit, to follow and capture ſuch privateers cloſe to the land, and, in one or two inſtances, at the

entrances of neutral ports. But what was the conſequence when theſe facts were made known and ſubſtantiated, in due form, by the Daniſh to the Britiſh government? A fair and honourable line of diſtinction was immediately drawn between thoſe acts of violence which were flagrant, and evidently offenſive to the honor and dignity of the crown of Denmark, and ſuch as were complained of by that court, upon falſe allegations only, and out of complaiſance to our enemies; and, in no leſs than three inſtances, perhaps the only three where there exiſted juſt cauſe for complaint, thoſe veſſels, two French and one Dutch, were delivered up at the requiſition of Denmark, conveyed by our own people back to Norway, on which coaſt they had been taken, and there fitted out again, by the agents of France, to cruize againſt us a ſecond time.

As we occaſionally ſeized the enemies privateers in the manner deſcribed, ſo thoſe privateers, in many inſtances, captured our merchantmen on the ſame coaſts, and in the ſame manner, and the reader will naturally conclude, that the court of Denmark purſued the ſame formality with the government of France which it had done with that of England, and obtained the reſtitution of thoſe merchantmen. Never:—excepting in one ſolitary inſtance of a ſmall Scotch brig, taken by a Dutch privateer, and that only after three years delays, ſolicitations, and

enormous loſſes on the part of the claimants, although in three other caſes, of the ſame nature, it was plainly demonſtrated, and repreſented at that court, that the captures were made in manifeſt violation of the territorial ſovereignty of the country, and one in particular, while lying at anchor at not a great deal more than a muſket ſhot diſtance from the ſhore.

NOTHING but the abandonment of truth, or a total dereliction of every honourable principle, could venture on the taſk of criminating the Britiſh government, on the ſcore of any real or wanton violation of the reſpect due to neutral nations; and wherever any of the ſubjects of his Britannic majeſty had, in the heat of their zeal to diſtinguiſh themſelves againſt the common aggreſſor, infringed the rights of Denmark, ſuch acts were inſtantly followed by the moſt ample ſatisfaction; by that ſatisfaction which Great Britain, in her turn, had a right to expect of her, but which too often proved as hopeleſs, as it was little to be expected that the envy and ſecret enmity of the Danes had not operated, upon the public mind, in that country, in a degree proportionate to what the falſehoods, miſrepreſentations, and wicked arts of our implacable enemy were as ingeniouſly calculated as induſtriouſly employed to produce.

BUT what will be ſaid in this country, when to the clamours and affected outcries of that nation, when to their pretended vexatious uſage, we oppoſe that which we ourſelves have experienced in ten-fold proportion on her part?

HAVE we not to complain of the ports of Norway having remained, during the firſt ſix years of the preſent war, open to the pirates and freebooters of France, for the purpoſes of repairs, revictualling, and wintering, as well as of bringing in, condemning, and ſelling their captures to the higheſt bidder?

HAVE we not to complain of our merchantmen being ſold in the ports of Norway, upon the ſimple adjudication of French or Dutch conſuls, who, to the laſting diſgrace of any nation, calling itſelf independent, have been ſuffered to exerciſe admiralty juriſdiction within the ports of that country; to eſtabliſh, in ſhort, an *imperium in imperio*, and that under the ſanction or connivance of a government profeſſing neutrality and friendſhip for Great Britain, and which has not attempted to deny the poſition recognized by the public law of nations, that no capture is good and legal, but what has been declared to be ſo, after having been brought into a port, and condemned by a tribunal belonging to the country of him who made the prize?

HAVE we not to complain, even, of the common laws of hoſpitality being broken, in the caſes of two ſhips, which have been forcibly detained at Bergen, in Norway, on the frivolous pretence alledged, in the one inſtance, by an agent of France, of unjuſtifiable proceedings on the part of her commander, and in the other, on the ground of a claim of property in the veſſel advanced by ſome Dutch merchants, and ſupported by their conſul, but to which there exiſts not a ſhadow of right?

HAVE not his majeſty's ſervants abroad, in the Eaſt as well as Weſt Indies, in the North as well as South of Europe, tranſmitted their complaints of the repeated infractions made by the ſubjects of Denmark of the neutrality, by the aid and aſſiſtance which they every where afforded to the enemies of Great Britain? And have we not, in particular, to remonſtrate againſt the conduct of the Danes on the occaſion of the late glorious war in India, when that correſpondence between Tippoo and the French at Mauritius, which tended to nothing leſs than our abſolute ruin and overthrow in that country, was carried on through their means; and, finally, have we not moſt bitterly to inveigh againſt a recent, and it may be hoped, laſt inſtance of hoſtile aggreſſion, when a Daniſh ſhip of war, with unheard of temerity, fired upon and killed our people, while employed in the lawful exerciſe of their duty?

We are now in poſſeſſion of plain, ſelf-evident, incontrovertible facts, from which we may draw our own concluſions and comments:—but as for the event, let us rely, with unſhaken confidence, in the juſtice of our cauſe, and on that vigour and energy which have, on ſo many other momentous occaſions, ſo conſpicuouſly diſtinguiſhed his majeſty's counſels; and if war becomes neceſſary, let us engage in it hand and heart, as the only means left of preſerving our honour and national independence, while we reſt aſſured that, if ever there exiſted a moment when it was truly dangerous to trifle with the intereſts of the nation, and eſſentially neceſſary to maintain her juſt rights with peculiar watchfulneſs, it is the preſent one, when, although any concert of the kind alluded to in the foregoing pages may not exiſt, or if it is in agitation, can never take any ſolid conſiſtency, our wily rival is about to uſe his laſt means of injuring us, and to improve the effect produced by his late continental ſucceſſes on the panic ſtruck ſtates of Europe, into the accompliſhment of his own ſchemes of ſubtle policy, and the introduction of a novel and moſt prepoſterous ſyſtem of maritime juriſprudence;—a moment in which that piratical nation, after having violated the neutral code, without ſcruple, during the whole of the preſent war, upon every pretence and opportunity, after having inverted every principle of public law, and overthrown

every private treaty of its own, has juſt now bethought itſelf of a new device, and inſtead of condemning neutral ſhips for conveying enemies property, as it had heretofore done without judicial inveſtigation, indemnification, or mercy, it now invites America, and all Europe, to recognize the principle of permitting neutral bottoms to protect enemies' property;—in other words, it deſires to have the privilege of conveying and receiving all manner of commodities by ſea, without let or hindrance from Great Britain, and that the ſole commercial inconvenience it ſhall ſuffer by war, ſhall be employing neutral bottoms inſtead of French ones, under the impudent pretence that the virtue of the keel ſhall purify the defects of the lading. But it is hardly to be ſuppoſed that any of the neutral nations, not even thoſe who maſk their envy, jealouſy, or malevolence, under this name, can find the ſmalleſt intereſt in theſe propoſitions, and it muſt be difficult to perſuade them that they will derive any advantage from ſuch a change in the law of nations.

The ocean is the common high road of the world, it belongs to no nation but to all; it cannot therefore be privileged, like rivers and arms of the ſeas, which are commanded by the ſhore, and partake of its dominion, and, whenever upon the ſeas, we are reſtricted from ſeizing the enemies property, it

muſt be in reſpect of the privileges of the place, and not of the veſſel, as has been before demonſtrated. But who is it, who would thus change the face of things, and of the common law and uſage of nations? Who can it be, but that nation which exiſting for many paſt years without either law or faith, has ſeized and plundered the enemies property even in the very warehouſes of neutral nations.

We know what we may expect from our implacable foe, but we know too what our means of defence are, and under providence, we ſhall alſo know how to uſe thoſe means, and prove, a ſecond time, to combined Europe, if neceſſary, that our men as well as ſhips are *hearts of oak*, while we look, with confidence, to the ultimate reſult of ſo noble a ſtruggle.—And happy it is for the reſt of the world, that ſuch power and means as we poſſeſs, have, by a provident and wiſe diſpenſationof things, fallen to the ſhare of a nation unmoved by any ambitious motives, or the falſe lure of territorial aggrandiſement, but which places its chief pride and glory in promoting commerce, the arts, and the general welfare of mankind.

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must be in respect of the privileges of the place, and not of the vessel, as has been before demonstrated. But who is it, who would thus change the face of things, and of the common law and usage of nations? Who can it be, but that nation which existing for many past years without either law or faith, has seized and plundered the enemies property even in the very warehouses of neutral nations.

We know what we may expect from our implacable foe, but we know too what our means of defence are, and under providence, we shall also know how to use those means, and prove, a second time, to combined Europe, if necessary, that our men as well as ships are *hearts of oak*, while we look, with confidence, to the ultimate result of so noble a struggle.—And happy it is for the rest of the world, that such power and means as we possess, have, by a provident and wise dispensation of things, fallen to the share of a nation unmoved by any ambitious motives, or the false lure of territorial aggrandisement, but which places its chief pride and glory in promoting commerce, the arts, and the general welfare of mankind.

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